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COMMENTS
Section 372.705, Florida Statutes: The
Constitutionality of the State's Hunter
Harassment Law in a Multi-State Context
I. INTRODUCTION
"If all mankind minus one were of one opinion and only one
person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more jus-
tified in silencing that person then [sic] he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind."'
Society in the new millennium has seen many examples of polarity:
rich and poor; powerful and weak; resourceful and incompetent; satis-
fied and hungry. This divergence, however, is not a concept unique to
the present day. It has existed since the beginning of time. The new
millennium has merely resulted in an escalation of the problems. One
such problem involves the clash between activists and the parties who
oppose them. At one time, the clash would have been settled physically.
In the modem era, however, two new methods have come to replace the
"pistols at dawn" solution: legislation and litigation.
In 1990, Florida enacted a law entitled "Harassment of hunters,
trappers, or fishermen."2 The law, in effect, criminalizes the act of inter-
fering with someone while she is in the process of hunting or fishing.
Interference can render the perpetrator guilty of a second-degree misde-
meanor.3 Florida is not alone in this field. To date, almost all fifty
states have enacted similar "hunter harassment" statutes.4 Some of the
statutes are more detailed than others. Some statutes leave readers won-
dering what type of activity is actually prohibited. Some are so explic-
itly detailed that each violation is specifically enumerated in its own
separate subsection. But they all seem to have one common theme: the
1. State v. Ball, 627 A.2d 892, 901 (Conn. 1993) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (quoting JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859)).
2. FLA. STAT. § 372.705 (1990).
3. See id. § 372.705(2).
4. See Jeffrey S. Thiede, Comment, Aiming for Constitutionality in the First Amendment
Forest: An Analysis of Hunter Harassment Statutes, 48 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1024 n.2 (1999). See
also Animal Rights Law, Hunter Harassment Statutes, at http://www.animal-law.org/hunters/
hunters.htm.
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proliferation of the dispute between activists and the hunters, fishers,
and trappers who oppose them. In Florida, as in some of the other states
where hunter harassment legislation has been enacted, the courts have
not had an opportunity to interpret their respective statutes, either
because no individual has been charged with violating the provisions, or
because cases have yet to reach the appellate level. It is interesting to
note that some of the statutes have been on the books for quite some
time. For example, Arizona enacted its hunter harassment law in 1981,
while both Kansas and Oregon have had their statutes since 1987.1 Yet
these states, and many others, currently have no judicial decisions
expressing an opinion as to the constitutionality of the laws.
Part II of this Comment first takes a look at some of the reasons
why hunter harassment legislation has been passed, and some of the
common constitutional arguments that seem to permeate the decisions in
the states where courts have ruled on hunter harassment statutes. To
date, the courts of only the following states have passed judgment on
their hunter harassment laws: Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin.6
Part III takes a look at the decisions reached in these states, and develops
a set of principles that characterize the ways in which the different juris-
dictions view the subject of hunter harassment. Part IV contains the
current version of Florida's hunter harassment statute. Part V provides a
detailed analysis of Florida's hunter harassment law using the principles
developed from the ten states in Part III as a framework. Part V also
develops and analyzes proposals for both activists and the Florida legis-
lature. Part VI concludes the Comment and suggests that the current
version of Florida's hunter harassment statute is in fact unconstitutional,
but may be saved by incorporating an additional specific intent element
and limiting its scope to acts that are purely physical.
5. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-316 (West 1996) (effective 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1014 (2000) (effective 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 496.994 (1999) (effective 1987). See also
Aileen M. Ugalde, Comment, The Right to Arm Bears: Activists' Protests Against Hunting, 45 U.
MiAMi. L. REV. 1109, 1111 n.13 (1991).
6. See State v. Ball, 627 A.2d 892 (Conn. 1993); Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375 (D.
Conn. 1988); State v. Casey, 876 P.2d 138 (Idaho 1994); State v. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d 1144 (I11.
1998); Woodstock Hunt Club v. Hindi, 684 N.E.2d 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); State v. Wicklund,
No. C3-96-1027, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 246 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1997); State v. Miner, 556
N.W.2d 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Lilburn, 875 P.2d 1036 (Mont. 1994); Opinion of the
Justices, 509 A.2d 749 (N.H. 1986); Binkowski v. State, 731 A.2d 64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999); State v. Mueller, 681 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Richardson v. State, No. 01-95-
01288-CR, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 308 (Tex. App. Jan. 21, 1999); Henry v. State, 797 S.W.2d
281 (Tex. App. 1990); State v. Bagley, 474 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. Justifications for Hunter Harassment Legislation
One of the major concerns of state legislatures has been the level of
violence that erupts when activists and their opponents meet face to face.
This concern is evident in some of the legislative history surrounding the
passage of hunter harassment laws. For example, Senator Benson of
Connecticut, a supporter of Connecticut's hunter harassment bill, stated
that "we need to have some sort of deterrent .... There have been some
instances where hunters' lives have been threatened by individuals
clearly because of the emotional type of objection that there is to...
[the] taking of animals' lives."7 Senator Eaton added: "[H]unters are
picked on often .... [They] should have the right to hunt in lands that
are made available to them."8 Senator Gunther concluded: "[T]he peo-
ple who are involved in this business of harassment are very apparent in
their harassment . . . and they do it [purposely and] habitually and
repeatedly."9 Some argue that state legislatures that have enacted hunter
harassment laws have done so only as a result of successful lobbying on
the part of hunters and their allies. For example, between 1981 and
1996, largely through the efforts of groups like the Sportsman's Caucus
and the Wildlife Legislative Fund of America, hunter harassment legis-
lation was rampant.' ° In fact, most of the state statutes are based on
model legislation prepared by the Wildlife Legislative Fund."' Also, the
National Rifle Association has vehemently supported the enactment of
hunter harassment laws on numerous occasions.' 2 As one advocate of
hunter harassment legislation has put it: "[It] was drafted with the inten-
tion of preventing harassment, while fully recognizing First Amendment
rights. There's a time and place for animal rightists to attempt to effect
societal change. The woods, during hunting season, is neither."' 3
B. First Amendment Constitutional Arguments
The majority of cases discussing the constitutionality of hunter har-
assment legislation focus on three major issues: (1) content neutrality;
(2) overbreadth; and (3) vagueness. Those seeking to challenge a stat-
ute's constitutionality usually concentrate their arguments on the latter
7. Dorman, 678 F. Supp. at 377.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d at 1150.
11. Id. (quoting Ugalde, supra note 5, at 1111 n.14).
12. Id.
13. John A. Grafton, Hunter Harassment Statutes: Do They Shoot Holes Into the First
Amendment?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 191, 191 (1993) (quoting Jim Glass, Protect Hunters from
Harassment, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 1990, at A8) (emphasis omitted).
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two, whereas the state most often structures its defense of the statute
around the issue of content-neutrality, in addition to arguing that the
terms of the statute are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
1. THE "CONTENT-NEUTRAL VS. CONTENT-BASED" DISTINCTION
A threshold inquiry that must be met when dealing with First
Amendment challenges to statutes is whether the statute at issue is con-
tent-neutral or content-based.' 4 A content-neutral statute is one that
does not target a particular type of speech or point of view, but instead
treats all expression alike. 5 A content-based statute, on the contrary,
singles out a specific kind of speech because of the message it seeks to
convey. 6 If the statute is content-based, the level of judicial scrutiny is
often strict, and the statute is saved only if it is supported by a compel-
ling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.' 7 If
the statute is content-neutral, courts apply an intermediate level of judi-
cial scrutiny, 8 and the state need only advance a substantial interest in
passing the legislation, provide evidence that the statute is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest, and demonstrate that alternative channels
of communication are left open.' 9
A second inquiry generally deals with the type of forum where the
regulated activity takes place. A traditional public forum is one which
the state has traditionally set aside for purposes of assembly and free
expression, such as a public park or sidewalk.2" If the statute is content-
based and proscribes conduct in a traditional public forum, courts apply
strict judicial scrutiny, and the state must advance a compelling interest
for passing the statute and provide evidence that the statute is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest. 21 If the statute is content-neutral, only
mid-level scrutiny is applied, and time, place, and manner (circum-
stance) restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial state
interest and alternative channels of communication must be left open.22
A nontraditional public forum is one which has not been set aside for
14. See Sean Peterson Durrant, Comment, Wyoming's Hunt Interference Law-Anarchy in
the Woods: How Far Afield Does the Right of Free Speech Extend?, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV.
505, 513 (1992).
15. Grafton, supra note 13, at 204.
16. Bradford J. Roegge, Note, Survival of the Fittest: Hunters or Activists? First Amendment
Challenges to Hunter Harassment Laws, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 437, 451 (1995).
17. Durrant, supra note 14, at 513.
18. Lance J. Schuster, Casenote & Comment, State v. Lilbum and State v. Casey: Harassing
Hunters with the First Amendment, 32 IDAHo L. REV. 469, 477 (1996).
19. Durrant, supra note 14, at 513.
20. Id. at 516.
21. Id.
22. id. at 516-17.
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purposes of public debate or exchange of ideas.23 If the statute is con-
tent-based and regulates activity in a nontraditional forum, strict scrutiny
still applies, and the state must demonstrate a compelling interest and
provide evidence that the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. 24 If the statute is content-neutral, however, the court utilizes a
rational relation analysis and sustains the legislation if it is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest.25
2. OVERBREADTH
A statute is constitutionally overbroad if it does not limit its scope
to areas justifiably within the state's control, but instead encompasses
other activities that are protected by the Constitution. 26 One commenta-
tor has compared the overbreadth analysis to firing pellets at a small
target.27 The shooter may hit the target (i.e., the desired conduct that the
statute seeks to regulate), but may also strike the surrounding areas (i.e.,
forms of protected speech). 28 A party asserting an overbreadth chal-
lenge, even though his own conduct may not be protected by the Consti-
tution, may nevertheless succeed, if he can show that the law is so broad
that it can be applied to other parties who engage in activities that are
constitutionally protected. 29
3. VAGUENESS
Vagueness issues come into play in two primary areas: (1) when a
person of ordinary intelligence cannot look at a statute and reasonably
understand what type of conduct it actually prohibits; and (2) when the
statute fails to define enforcement standards and guidelines for police
and other officials to observe.30 Simply stated, laws which leave ordi-
nary persons without notice as to what form of activity is criminal, or
laws which leave an individual guessing as to their meaning, will be
considered unconstitutionally vague, and possibly void.31 Content-neu-
trality, overbreadth, and vagueness are not unique to the hunter harass-
ment field. Rather, these issues surface in the context of statutory law in
general. Nevertheless, they constitute an important part of challenges to
hunter harassment legislation, as Part III of this Comment demonstrates.
23. Id. at 517.
24. Id. at 521.
25. Id. at 517.
26. See Ugalde, supra note 5, at 1132.
27. See Grafton, supra note 13, at 200.
28. Id.
29. Schuster, supra note 18, at 479.
30. Grafton, supra note 13, at 200.
31. Schuster, supra note 18, at 481.
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III. STATE AND FEDERAL CASE LAW
Courts in the ten states that have addressed the constitutionality of
hunter harassment statutes have not reached the same decision. This
split among the jurisdictions has prompted at least one commentator to
urge the United States Supreme Court to decide the issue once and for
all at its next opportunity.32 This part of the Comment will provide a
detailed description of the decisions from the ten states. The decisions
will be presented chronologically, as some of the more recent cases
often make reference to the earlier court opinions. In addition, the rele-
vant parts of the various hunter harassment statutes will be discussed in
light of their treatment by the courts.
The decisions from the ten states can be grouped together into six
primary categories: [1] unconstitutional in toto (Opinion of the Justices
and Dorman) (i.e., invalidating an entire hunter harassment statute); [2]
partially unconstitutional (Casey) (i.e., holding unconstitutional only
certain provisions of a statute); [3] non-constitutional (Henry, Mueller,
and Richardson) (i.e., finding parties guilty or innocent of violating a
hunter harassment statute through statutory interpretation, but allowing
the court to avoid addressing the statute's constitutionality) [4] constitu-
tional non-implication of speech (Bagley and Wicklund) (i.e., interpret-
ing terms of a statute to address only physical conduct, as opposed to
speech, and thus preserving the statute's constitutionality); [5] constitu-
tional enumeration (Ball and Binkowski) (i.e., deferring to the legisla-
ture's inclusion of several enumerated acts that characterize physical
conduct); and [6] constitutional analysis of "dissuasion" provisions
(Lilburn, Miner, Woodstock Hunt Club, and Sanders) (i.e., analyzing the
constitutionality of a "dissuasion" element contained in a statute).
A. New Hampshire
New Hampshire was the first state to deal with the constitutionality
of hunter harassment legislation. In 1986, the legislature asked the state
supreme court to consider the proposed hunter harassment law, which
the state planned to enact.33 In a per curiam decision, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court advised the legislature that the statute, as written,
would violate the state constitution.34 The statute in question prohibited
32. See Ugalde, supra note 5, at 1135.
33. Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d 749 (N.H. 1986).
34. Id. at 753. It should be noted that although the New Hampshire Supreme Court
considered the statute under the state constitution, it nevertheless used federal cases in its analysis,
such as Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972), both of which addressed First Amendment principles under the United States
Constitution. See Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d at 752.
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a person from interfering with the taking of wild animals if the person
acted with intent to prevent the taking." It further prohibited the person
from disturbing wild animals in order to "prevent or hinder" their tak-
ing.36 Its remaining sections outlawed: (1) physical or verbal conduct
that aimed to provoke a hunter engaged in the lawful taking of wildlife,
if such conduct was intended to dissuade or otherwise prevent the tak-
ing; (2) preventing a hunter's enjoyment of the outdoors by verbal har-
assment or physical action when the hunter was lawfully engaged in
hunting activity; and (3) remaining on public land or trespassing on pri-
vate land with an intent to violate the hunter harassment law in any
way.
37
In its analysis, the court first observed that the statute's language
was too broad, constituting an infringement on free speech in violation
of the New Hampshire constitution.38 The statute would have regulated
speech that dangerously interfered with lawful activity or that resulted in
a breach of the peace, but would also have regulated speech that served
merely as an expression of an opinion without such similar risks. 39 The
court stated, however, that the protections of free speech under the state
constitution were not limitless. Rather, free speech may be regulated by
time, place, and manner restrictions that further the state's interest, but
may not be connected to the content and subject matter of the speech
itself.4°
The court concluded that the proposed statute was not content-neu-
tral, as it "discriminate[d] among points of view."'" As an illustration,
the court noted that the provision preventing the provocation of hunters
with intent to dissuade them from hunting could be applied both to anti-
hunting advocates as well as to conservationists who direct pro-conser-
vation statements at the hunters.42 As a result, the proposed bill acted as
35. Id. at 751.
36. Id.
37. Id. There were three additional provisions in the proposed law. These included: (1) the
prohibition of disobeying an official's order to disburse; (2) the provision for injunctive relief and
damages which encompassed punitive damages and any economic loss sustained on the part of the
hunter; and (3) the labeling of a violation of any prohibition in the statute as a violation of the
statute in general. Id. These provisions appear in several states' hunter harassment statutes, but
this Comment would prefer to treat them as collateral issues and instead concentrate on the
"disturbance," "interference," and "dissuasion" provisions.
38. Id. at 752.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
41. Id. at 752.
42. Id. Although this illustration may not adequately define what the court earlier termed a
"discriminat[ion] among points of view," it would be safe to assume that the court would agree
that anti-hunting ideology would be singled out as the target of the statute, whereas pro-hunting
commentary would most likely not subject an individual to prosecution.
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an unconstitutional content-based restriction. Additionally, the court
found the law to be too vague, as it gave an ordinary individual little or
no notice as to what activity would actually fall within its scope.43
Furthermore, because the bill neglected to define critical terms and
could therefore be interpreted to encompass several categories of pro-
tected speech, the court also found the bill to be overbroad." The court
noted, for example, that the section of the bill that prohibited a person
from engaging in an activity that would affect the behavior of an animal
with intent to prevent its taking could be read to prohibit a landowner
from posting signs or putting out food on his own property to attract
wild animals and save them from the hunt."
B. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Two years after the decision in New Hampshire, the Second Circuit
became the next court to pass judgment on a state hunter harassment
statute.46 The Connecticut legislature enacted its Hunter Harassment
Act in 1985.47 The Act made it criminal for a person to "(1) interfere
with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person, or acts in prepara-
tion for such taking, with intent to prevent such taking; or (2) harass
another person who is engaged in the lawful taking of wildlife or acts in
preparation for such taking."4
On January 30, 1986, Francelle Dorman approached several hunters
on state-owned forest property and attempted to dissuade them from
hunting waterfowl by walking along with them and speaking about the
cruelty of hunting and the beauty of the animals.49 After refusing to
leave the area, a law enforcement officer placed Ms. Dorman under
arrest, but the prosecutor decided to dismiss the case on grounds that the
arrest had been premature.5" Four months later, Ms. Dorman brought an
action in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prose-
cutor and state public safety commissioner, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the Hunter Harassment Act violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.5" Ms. Dorman argued
that the Act facially regulated protected free speech, as it failed to define
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 753.
46. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988).
47. Id. at 433 (referring to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183a (1985)).
48. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183a (1985)) (emphasis omitted).
49. Id. at 434.
50. Id. Apparently, Ms. Dorman had only been discussing what she planned to do to interfere
with the hunting of the geese, rather than actually engaging in the act of interference itself.
51. Id.
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what constituted "interference" or "harassment," and as the phrase "acts
in preparation" was not confined to any specific time, place, or circum-
stance limitation.52
The district court found the Act unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad. 3 On appeal the Second Circuit first observed that language in a
statute prohibiting activity that involves interference or harassment
applies equally to verbal, as well as to physical conduct. 54 The court
then drew a distinction between a content-based and a content-neutral
regulation. It held that the former required a compelling state interest
and that it be narrowly drawn to achieve that end, while the latter could
encompass a time, place, and manner restriction, provided that it was
necessary to serve a significant government interest and that it left open
alternative channels of communication. 6 Applying these rules to the
Hunter Harassment Act, the court of appeals noted that although the Act
first appeared to be a content-neutral regulation, in reality it intended to
insulate hunters from verbal as well as physical activity perpetrated by
those, like Ms. Dorman, who were opposed to hunting.57 To the extent
that the Act could be viewed as content-based, it would be unconstitu-
tional, as Connecticut did not have, or at least the defendants had not
shown that the state had, a compelling interest in protecting hunters from
harassment. 8
The court concluded by stating that the terms "interfere," "harass,"
and "acts in preparation" were not specifically defined and could not
therefore be justified as reasonable time, place, or circumstance regula-
tions of speech.59 Quoting the district court, the Second Circuit
expressed its dismay as to the wide range of activities that could be
included under the "acts in preparation" provision: "buying supplies
long before the actual hunt takes place; ... consulting a road map;...
making plans during a workplace coffee break; or even getting a good
night's sleep before embarking on a hunting trip."6
In dissent, Judge Miner argued that the court should have certified
52. Id. at 436. As part of their appeal, the prosecutor and commissioner sought a certification
to the Connecticut Supreme Court of the terms "interfere," "harass," and "acts in preparation," but
the Second Circuit denied their motion. Id. This Comment will not address the certification issue.
53. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 376-77 (D. Conn. 1998).
54. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1988) (referring to City of Houston v.
Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987)). As in Hill, the court in Dorman concluded that the statute at issue
"deal[t] not with core criminal conduct, but with speech." Id. at 437 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at
460).
55. Id. at 437.
56. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educs. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 383 (D. Conn. 1988)).
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the ambiguous terms to the Connecticut Supreme Court because there
had been several earlier cases, dealing with non-hunter harassment
issues, wherein the same terms had been defined.61 Judge Miner opined
that the certification could assist in affixing a limiting construction on
the terms of the statute, and provide the Connecticut Supreme Court
with an opportunity to excise troublesome portions of the statute on state
grounds.62
C. Texas
In Henry v. State, Texas became the third state to address hunter
harassment legislation. 63 There, a Texas jury found Rex Henry guilty of
violating the Sportsman's Rights Act, which provides: "No person may
intentionally interfere with another person lawfully engaged in the pro-
cess of hunting or catching wildlife. '64 Eyewitnesses identified Henry
as the individual who drove a pickup truck alongside the perimeter of a
deer lease, repeatedly slamming the doors and making other kinds of
noise to interfere with a deer hunt.65 These same witnesses testified that
Henry engaged in this conduct only during deer season and that he had
admitted in the past that he had raised the deer as pets and did not want
to see them hunted on the adjacent property.66 Henry argued on appeal
that the evidence failed to show that he was on the same land on which
the hunting was taking place when he engaged in the interference activ-
ity. 67 The court rejected this argument and upheld his conviction, find-
ing that the Sportsman's Rights Act did not require the perpetrator to be
on the same property as the hunter.68
D. Wisconsin
One year later, in 1991, Wisconsin became the fourth state to adju-
dicate the merits of a constitutional challenge to its hunter harassment
statute.69 James Bagley and two other individuals prevented a group of
61. Id. at 438.
62. Id. at 439. Ball partially answered Judge Miner's certification concerns, wherein the
Connecticut Supreme Court had an opportunity to analyze a revised version of the state's hunter
harassment statute in 1993. See infra Part III.E and accompanying notes 83-107.
63. 797 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App. 1990).
64. TEx. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 62.0125(c) (Vernon 1990). The statute defines
"process of hunting or catching" as "any act directed at the lawful hunting or catching of wildlife,
including camping or other acts preparatory to hunting or catching of wildlife that occur on land
or water on which the affected person has the right or privilege of hunting or catching that
wildlife." Id. § 62.0125(b)(2).
65. Henry, 797 S.W.2d at 282.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. State v. Bagley, 474 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
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Native American spearfishers from launching a boat by using their own
boat to block the boat landing.7 ° They were charged in violation of the
state hunter harassment law, which makes it a crime to interfere with the
lawful taking of wildlife with intent to prevent the taking by "impeding
or obstructing a person who is engaged in an activity associated with
lawful hunting, fishing, or trapping."71 The phrase "activity associated
with lawful hunting, fishing or trapping" is defined as "travel, camping
or other acts that are preparatory to lawful hunting, fishing or trapping
and that are done by a hunter, fisher or trapper or by a member of a
hunting, fishing or trapping party. 72 The trial court dismissed the
charges, finding that the hunter harassment law was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.73 The appellate court reversed on both issues.74
First, the appellate court held that the statute, by using such phrases
as "interfere," "impede," or "obstruct," only prevented demonstrators
from physically interfering with hunters or fishermen, but did not pro-
hibit them from verbally interfering.75 Thus, the statute did not contra-
vene First Amendment principles of overbreadth and did not serve as a
content-based restriction.76 The court distinguished the Connecticut
statute invalidated in Dorman on grounds that it only used the term
"interfere" without any further limiting construction, while the Wiscon-
sin statute made reference to "impede" and "obstruct," which served to
refine and limit the notion of "interference."77 The court relied on the
dictionary definitions of impede: "to interfere with or get in the way of
the progress of;" and obstruct: "to block up; place an obstacle in or fill
with obstacles or impediments to passing," to conclude that the everyday
usage of these terms describes physical, not verbal, activity.78 The court
held that inclusion of the affirmative defense provision in the statute
evidenced the legislature's intent to exclude protected speech from the
scope of the statute and distinguish it from conduct that was purely
physical.79
70. Id. at 762.
71. Id. at 763 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 29.223(2)(a)(3) (1990)). Bagley and the others also
failed to obey an order from a Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources warden to desist from
their activity in violation of section 29.223(2)(b). Bagley, 474 N.W.2d at 762-63. The statute also
provides an affirmative defense if an individual's conduct is protected by the right to freedom of
speech under either the state or federal Constitution. Wis. STAT. § 29.223(3m) (1990).
72. Id. at 763 (quoting Wis. STAT. 29.223(1) (1991) renumbered in 1997 to Wis. STAT.
§ 29.083(1)).
73. Bagley, 474 N.W.2d at 762.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 763.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 764.
78. Id.
79. Id. The court advised that had Bagley and the other defendants demonstrated by the
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The court also addressed the issue of vagueness. The court fol-
lowed the general rule that a person has no standing to argue a statute is
void for vagueness if that person's activity clearly falls within the core
of conduct prohibited by the statute. 80 The trial court found that no such
core violation existed because the Native Americans had not yet
engaged in the act of fishing.8 The appellate court disagreed, however,
finding that the statute applied to preparatory acts as well as to actual
acts, and launching a boat amounted to an act of preparation.82 The
defendants were therefore without standing to assert a vagueness
challenge.
E. Connecticut
In 1993, Connecticut faced a second challenge to the validity of its
hunter harassment statute. In State v. Ball, the Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a revised version of the statute.83
The earlier version prohibited "interfer[ing] with the lawful taking of
wildlife by another person, or acts in preparation for such taking, with
intent to prevent such taking" and "harass[ing] another person who is
engaged in the lawful taking of wildlife or acts in preparation for such
taking."84 The current law reads: "(a) No person shall obstruct or inter-
fere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person at the location
where the activity is taking place with intent to prevent such taking."85
In subsection (b), the new law goes on to enumerate a series of acts that
constitute violations of the statute when perpetrated intentionally or
knowingly: (1) driving or disturbing wildlife for the purpose of dis-
rupting its lawful taking while another person is lawfully engaged in the
process of taking the wildlife; (2) blocking, impeding or otherwise
harassing that person; (3) using natural or artificial stimuli to affect the
behavior of the wildlife in order to prevent its taking; (4) building barri-
ers to prevent a person from accessing the area where wildlife may be
lawfully taken; (5) interjecting oneself into the line of fire; (6) affecting
the condition of public or private property used as a hunting area in
order to impair its usefulness as such an area; or (7) entering or remain-
evidence that their activities constituted pure speech or expressive conduct, as opposed to normal
conduct, a different result might have been reached. Id. at 765. The defendants, however, failed to
show how their conduct (i.e., blocking the launching of boats with their own boats) merited First
Amendment protection.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 627 A.2d 892 (Conn. 1993).
84. See Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 433 (2d. Cir. 1988) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
183a (1985)).
85. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183a (West 1993) (emphasis added).
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ing on private lands without the owner's permission with the intent to
engage in any of these prohibited activities.86
On the morning of October 19, 1991, Robert Dubois, a duly
licensed bow hunter, waited at the entrance to a state park forest. As
Dubois waited, the defendants approached him and identified them-
selves as anti-hunting activists and indicated that they would follow
Dubois into the forest.87 After Dubois entered the park, the defendants
formed a semicircle around him directly within his line of fire and
attempted to dissuade him from hunting.88 A conservation officer
placed the defendants under arrest after they refused to leave the park.89
The defendants moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the Con-
necticut hunter harassment statute was unconstitutional, both facially
and as applied to the facts of their case, under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.9' The trial court denied
the motion.91
The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed three primary issues: (1)
whether the statute was directed only at conduct or whether it implicated
speech; (2) whether, even if it encompassed conduct bordering on
expression, the statute was content-neutral, and the state had an impor-
tant interest to protect; and (3) whether any unresolved question as to the
state's interest in regulating the interference with hunting necessitated a
remand to the trial court. 92 The court first concluded that the statute
governed communicative as well as non-communicative conduct.93 The
state argued that the statute did not implicate the First Amendment at all.
The court disagreed, citing cases holding that activities such as parades,
dances, picketing, wearing arm bands, rock music, and sleeping in a
public park, though conduct, also involve communication.94 The court
bolstered its position by pointing out that section 53a-183a(b)(1) of the
86. Id. § 53a-183a(b). It is important to emphasize a few things about the revised version of
the statute. Note that "obstruct" has replaced "harass" in subsection (a); that "otherwise harasses"
in subsection (b)(2) is further defined by inclusion of the physical conduct terms "block" and
"impede;" and that the Connecticut legislature added the phrase "at the location where the activity
is taking place" and deleted altogether the phrase "acts in preparation." See id. § 53a-183a and
accompanying legislative history and notes.
87. Ball, 627 A.2d at 895.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 894.
91. Id. The defendants entered pleas of nolo contendere, and were found guilty and fined
$100. See id. The trial court ruled only on the contention that the statute was facially invalid, but
did not consider the allegation that the statute was unconstitutional as applied. As the defendants
had already entered their nolo contendere pleas, the Connecticut Supreme Court was unable to
consider the merits of their "as applied" contention.
92. Id. at 896.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 896-97.
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statute ("driving or disturbing wildlife for the purpose of disrupting the
lawful taking of wildlife where another person is engaged in the process
of lawfully taking wildlife") would itself be sufficient to implicate the
First Amendment, as the disruption or driving away may be accom-
plished by either physical or verbal acts.95
Next, the court decided that the statute as written was content-neu-
tral and not content-based.96 The defendants had argued that the statute
would be enforced only against those who, by words or actions, sought
to convey the message that hunting was wrong.97 The court stated that
simply because an otherwise content-neutral statute permits excessive
prosecutorial discretion does not automatically render it content-based.98
The defendants also argued that the statute's legislative history was evi-
dence that it was enacted for the sole purpose of insulating hunters from
the views of activists. The court disagreed and held that an otherwise
constitutional statute does not become unconstitutional because the leg-
islature was motivated by ill-will.99 The court held that the Hunter Har-
assment Act was content-neutral since it restricted all expressive
conduct in contravention of its terms, and did not facially single out a
particular point of view. 1" Quoting the trial court, the Connecticut
Supreme Court observed that any noise or disruptive activity, whether
perpetrated by an animal activist, or by another individual who was sim-
ply dismayed at the hunter's choice of weapon, or who felt the need to
pray out loud, would amount to a violation of the statute, as long as it
was effected with an intent to disrupt the hunt.101
Finally, the court had to consider Connecticut's interest in passing
the hunter harassment law. The resolution of this issue ultimately turned
on whether the state park in this case was a traditional public forum or a
nonpublic forum.102 If the park were a traditional public forum, the state
would have to advance a significant interest in order for the statute to
survive a constitutional challenge, but if the park were a nonpublic
forum, the state needed only to demonstrate a reasonable state inter-
est. 10 3 The court decided to remand the case for a determination of the
95. Id. at 897.
96. Id. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes for a more detailed discussion of the
distinction between statutes that are content-neutral and those that are content-based.
97. Ball, 627 A.2d at 897.
98. Id. at 897-98.
99. Id. at 898.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 897.
102. Id. at 899.
103. Id. Obviously, the defendants would argue for the former because the burden of proof on
the part of the state would be much higher. Note that the traditional public versus nonpublic
distinction only comes into play when the court has already determined that the regulation at issue
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forum issue before it could analyze Connecticut's interest in passing the
Hunter Harassment Act. 104
In dissent, Justice Berdon argued that the "blocks, impedes or oth-
erwise harasses" provision in the statute was troublesome.10 5  He
believed that the legislative history indicated that Connecticut intended
to insulate hunters from expressive speech by anti-hunting activists."0 6
As a result, he argued that the statute was a content-based restriction,
and that on remand, the state should have to prove a compelling interest
in order to survive the defendants' constitutional challenges. 10 7
F. Montana
State v. Lilburn °8 presented the Montana Supreme Court in 1994
with an opportunity to review Montana's hunter harassment law. The
state had apparently granted three individuals special licenses to hunt
bison that had migrated off the grounds of Yellowstone National
Park."0 9 On the day of the hunt, Lilburn and several others were seen on
snowmobiles and cross-country skis trying to herd the bison back on to
is content-neutral. If the court determines the statute to be content-based, the distinction does not
figure into the equation, and the state must advance a compelling state interest, regardless of
where the activity is taking place. See supra Part ll.B.
104. Ball, 627 A.2d at 899. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and
determined that a state park is a nonpublic forum. State v. Ball, Nos. CR1874479, CR1874480,
CR1874481, CR1874482, 2000, Conn. Super. LEXIS 3003 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2000). The
court stated: "The state forests and parks have not been opened for the use by the public as a place
for expressive activity. The state forests and parks have historically been utilized for recreation
and preservation of natural habitat." Id. at *20. The court also found that Connecticut had a
significant state interest in seeking to regulate activity in the state parks. Id. at *28. The court
adopted the state's argument that citizens' enjoyment of parks and killing wildlife in general
constitute a significant state interest and amount to an accepted public policy. Id. at *27-28. The
court, however, may have analyzed the state interest issue more intensely than the Connecticut
Supreme Court instructed. The supreme court required the trial court on remand to find only a
reasonable state interest if it preliminarily determined that a state park is a nonpublic forum. State
v. Ball, 627 A.2d 892, 899 (Conn. 1993). The trial court incorrectly analyzed the state interest
issue under the significant interest standard. One may observe that the trial court in reality
committed no error, as it applied the standard more stringently than was required. The long-term
effect of the error, however, could perhaps be anything but harmless. Enjoyment of parks and of
killing wildlife in general may be accepted as "reasonable" interests under the lower threshold
required by the Connecticut Supreme Court, but it is certainly debatable whether such interests
suffice under the more stringent "significant" standard. Critics of the trial court's error may point
out that the court, in effect, lessened the burden of proof required under an analysis of the content-
neutral standard, and created a precedent for future courts in other states faced with the same task
of resolving the forum issue. These courts may now find it easier to uphold hunter harassment
statutes without having to scrutinize as strictly as the Connecticut Supreme Court required in
remanding the case in Ball.
105. Ball, 627 A.2d at 900 (emphasis in original).
106. Id. at 901.
107. Id.
108. 875 P.2d 1036 (Mont. 1994).
109. Id. at 1038.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the park grounds. 10 Lilburn then approached one of the hunters, plac-
ing himself directly in the line of fire on two occasions.' He was
charged and convicted of violating section 87-3-142(3) of the Montana
Hunter Harassment Law, which provided: "No person may disturb an
individual engaged in the lawful taking of a wild animal with intent to
dissuade the individual or otherwise prevent the taking of the animal."' 12
The issue on appeal concerned the scope of section 87-3-142(3);
specifically, whether it encompassed speech along with conduct.11 3
Lilburn argued that the provision was both overbroad and content-based
in that it criminalized both speech and conduct based solely on the con-
tent involved (an anti-hunting message), while it permitted other types
of conduct and speech that conveyed a different message. 1 4 The trial
court agreed that the provision was overbroad and found that protected
"[c]onduct such as prayer vigils at trailheads, the singing of protest
songs or the burning of hunting maps, if done with the intent to dissuade
a hunter, would be violations of the statute." ' 1 5 The trial court also con-
cluded that the statute prohibited communication that would dissuade a
hunter from hunting, yet permitted communication that served to
encourage hunting, even if this latter communication resulted in distract-
ing the hunter." 6 The Montana Supreme Court disagreed.
The supreme court argued that provisions in a statute cannot be
read in isolation and should be considered in light of the context in
which they are used by the legislature.' 7 As a result, even though the
statute may encompass verbal utterances as well as physical acts, the
content of those utterances is irrelevant; the prohibition does not depend
on whether an anti-hunting message is being conveyed." 8 The court
downplayed the importance Liburn placed on the word "dissuade," and
explained the statute in terms of the content-neutral versus content-based
distinction.' 'I Although a statute may have a discriminatory impact, as
Liburn contended, it nevertheless would be content-neutral if the objec-
tive behind it is aimed neither at advancing nor inhibiting a specific
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1039 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-142(3) (1994)). The statute was amended
in 1997. For a discussion of the amendments, see infra Part V.F.
113. Lilburn, 875 P.2d at 1040. Lilburn failed to argue that his own conduct (stepping into the
line of fire) was constitutionally protected, nor did he contend that the statute, as applied to him,
infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1041.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1041-42.
119. Id. at 1042.
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point of view. 120 The court considered the legislative history and found
that Montana was not acting to suppress speech based upon content, but
simply to protect both hunters and activists from accidents and violent
confrontations that could occur should emotions run high.' 2' Further-
more, by reading "dissuade" in the context of the entire statute, the court
found it apparent that the term was intended to refer only to the act of
disturbing the hunter while he or she was engaged in a lawful hunt.122
The fact that speech or some form of conduct would result in disturbing
a hunter was not dependent at all on the content of what was expressed,
for "a person could blurt out anything at the moment a hunter is trying to
shoot, and this could 'disturb' the hunter by distracting him or her, or by
scaring the animal away." 12 The court concluded its overbreadth analy-
sis by distinguishing Dorman on the basis that the Montana statute did
not reach "acts of preparation" but was confined only to the actual
moment of hunting itself. 124
The second part of the opinion addressed the void-for-vagueness
challenge. As in Bagley, the Montana Supreme Court found that a per-
son who had clearly engaged in conduct that a statute, by its terms, pros-
cribes was without standing to assert a claim for void-for-vagueness.125
When Lilburn stood in the hunter's line of fire, the court noted, he
clearly disturbed the hunter, and his intent was indisputably to prevent
the taking of the animal.12
6
G. Idaho
The Idaho Supreme Court also decided the constitutionality of its
hunter harassment law in 1994, in State v. Casey.127 Claire Casey
walked onto state land adjacent to the ranch on which she was working
to speak with some hunters who were hunting chukars. 128 Ms. Casey
was concerned about the chukars, but the hunters paid her no atten-
tion. 129 She then waved her arms and began to scream in an effort to
scare the chukars away, cursed at the hunters, and stood in front of them
so that they were unable to shoot. 130 She was subsequently charged with
violating the provision in the Idaho hunter harassment statute that pro-
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1043.
123. Id. at 1042-43.
124. Id. at 1043.
125. Id. at 1044.
126. Id.
127. 876 P.2d 138 (Idaho 1994).
128. Id. at 139.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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hibited a person from "enter[ing] or remain[ing] in any area where any
animal may be taken with the intent to interfere with the lawful taking or
pursuit of wildlife." 13' She appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, which
overturned her conviction. 132
The supreme court initially concluded that the provision at issue
was not a regulation of protected speech, as Casey had argued, because
facially, the provision implicated only conduct that served as an interfer-
ence with the taking of wildlife without in any way singling out conduct
that was necessarily expressive. 33 The court, however, did agree with
Casey that the provision was unconstitutionally overbroad because it did
not specifically limit its reach to physical interference, nor did it exclude
protected forms of speech and include only unprotected speech such as
fighting words or obscenity. 34 The court noted that the potential "chil-
ling effect" on free speech would be great: "[S]omeone might enter an
area where wildlife could be legally hunted and do nothing more than
announce his opposition to hunting and his intention to interfere with
such taking. Such a person would be in violation of subsection (1)(c)
and yet his actions constitute protected free speech."'' 35 The court,
therefore, held that section 36-1510(1)(c) was unconstitutional. 136
In dissent, Justice Silak argued that the Supreme Court of the
United States has advised that the overbreadth doctrine is "strong
medicine" and should be used sparingly.' 37 He would have affixed a
limiting construction to the subsection by adding the word "physically"
so the statute would read: "enter[ing] or remain[ing] in any area where
any animal may be taken with the intent to [physically] interfere with the
lawful taking or pursuit of wildlife."' 38 He concluded that Casey's con-
viction should have been upheld under the limiting construction because
she was not engaged in any form of constitutionally protected expression
when she waved her arms around and screamed at the chukars. 139
131. Id. (quoting IDAHO CODE § 36-1510(l)(c) (Michie 1994)).
132. Id. at 139, 141.
133. Id. at 140.
134. Id. The court cited to City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), for the proposition
that "acts such as interference and harassment encompass verbal as well as physical conduct
unless otherwise defined." Id.
135. Casey, 876 P.2d at 140-41.
136. The court was careful to point out that its decision invalidated only that particular
subsection and was not intended to apply to the remaining provisions of the statute. Id. at 141.
The court also stated that because it had already invalidated the provision on overbreadth grounds,
it would not consider the void-for-vagueness argument that the defendant had raised.
137. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
138. Id. at 142.
139. Id.
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H. Ohio
The next state to consider a hunter harassment law was Ohio in
1996. In State v. Mueller,""4 two property owners gave several hunters
permission to hunt deer on their private property. 4 1 Arthella Mueller, to
whom the adjoining property owner had given permission to patrol his
own land and keep the hunters away, began to wave her arms and yell at
the deer when they crossed on to the land she was patrolling, in an effort
to prevent them from going back to the adjoining property.'12 Neither
the hunters nor Ms. Mueller actually crossed the property line. 143 Never-
theless, Ms. Mueller was convicted of violating the provision of the
Ohio hunter harassment statute which provided, in pertinent part: "No
person shall purposely prevent or attempt to prevent any person from
hunting ... a wild animal as authorized by this chapter by any of the
following means: . . . (2) Creating a visual, aural, olfactory, or physical
stimulus intended to affect the behavior of the wild animal being hunted
.... ,,' Mueller argued that section 1533.03(C) of the statute was dis-
positive of the case and would not render her liable under section
1533.03(A)(2). 4 5 Section 1533.03(C) stated: "This section applies only
to acts committed on lands or waters upon which hunting, trapping, or
fishing activity may lawfully occur." '14 6
The trial court disagreed and found that her actions carried over to
the adjacent property and brought her within the scope of section
1533.03(A)(2) much like a noisy stereo would subject its owner to a
disorderly conduct or nuisance charge if brought by a neighbor.'47 The
appellate court, however, reversed and stated that to ignore the express
language of section 1533.03(C) would be to defy the legislature's
intent. 4 8 Moreover, the owner of the land on which Mueller was pre-
sent expressly forbade any hunting activity to take place thereon. As a
result, hunting could therefore not "lawfully occur" on that land within
the meaning of section 1533.03(C). 49 As Mueller's actions were com-
mitted on land where hunting could not take place, the hunter harass-
ment statute had not been violated, and the conviction was therefore
overturned. 50
140. 681 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
141. Id. at 984.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 984-85 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE § 1533.03(A)(2) (1996)).
145. Id. at 984.
146. Id. at 985 (quoting Onto REV. CODE § 1533.03(C) (1996)).
147. Mueller, 681 N.E.2d at 985.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. One year after Mueller, the Ohio legislature enacted an additional statute to
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I. Minnesota
In State v. Miner,15 l Minnesota became the next state to adjudicate
a constitutional challenge to a hunter harassment statute. The defend-
ants were part of a group of protesters who visited a state park hosting a
bow hunt to control the deer population. 152 The group, several members
of which were dressed in bright orange colors, approached a few of the
hunters and tried to convince them not to kill the deer. ' 53 Some of them
succeeded in scaring the deer away and others were able to steal some of
the scent bombs set by the hunters to attract the deer.'5 4 The defendants
were arrested for refusing to leave the park and later charged with violat-
ing Minnesota's hunter harassment statute. 55 Section 97A.037(1) pro-
vides: "A person who has the intent to prevent, disrupt, or dissuade the
taking of a wild animal or enjoyment of the out-of-doors may not disturb
or interfere with another person who is lawfully taking a wild animal or
preparing to take a wild animal."'' 56
The court first observed that the use of the word "dissuade" in sec-
tion 97A.037(1) rendered that section content-based and therefore pre-
sumptively invalid.' 57 The court considered "dissuade" in light of its
dictionary definition and concluded that the word involved some form of
argument, advice, appeal, or reasoning designed to deter a hunter from
taking a wild animal. 58 In other words, an intent to dissuade a hunter
was akin to an intent to convey a specific message, and was therefore an
impermissible content-based regulation.159
Although Minnesota argued that it had an interest in protecting a
hunter's right to lawfully take wild animals, it was unable to show why a
provision that prohibits only speech delivered with intent to dissuade the
taking of the wild animal was necessary to serve that interest. 60 The
court therefore excised the "dissuade" element from section 97A.037(l)
supplement the preexisting hunter harassment law. The new statute addressed the same facts as in
Mueller, but proclaimed a much different result. It is now illegal in Ohio to create noise or loud
sounds that are aimed to distract wildlife, even if the perpetrator is not making the noise or
disruptive sounds on the same property where the hunt is taking place. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1533.03.1 (Anderson Supp. 2001).
151. 556 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
152. Id. at 580.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 580-81.
155. Id. at 581 (referring to MINN. STAT. § 97A.037 (1994)).
156. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. 97A.037(l) (1994)). This section defines "preparing to take a
wild animal" as including "travel, camping, and other acts that occur on land or water where the
affected person has the right or privilege to take lawfully a wild animal." Id.
157. Miner, 556 N.W.2d at 582.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 583.
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but left the remaining provisions intact. 161 The court justified the new
version of the statute, in response to the defendants' second argument
that the section was not a valid time, place, or circumstance regulation,
by stating that the modified version applied only to conduct without any
connection to speech. 162
The court then distinguished Dorman by arguing that the "acts in
preparation" provision found there to be unconstitutional was virtually
limitless, whereas the similar provision in the Minnesota statute not only
defines "acts" as, inter alia, travel and camping, but also confines those
acts to land or water areas where a person has the lawful right to hunt. 163
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the term "disturb" was
too vague, as the term was easily understood and was further limited and
applied only when the specific intent of "prevent[ing] or disrupt[ing] the
taking of a wild animal" was first met.'"
Finally, the appellate court addressed the defendants' contention
that section 97A.037(l) was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of
the case because the defendants were engaging in protected speech when
they approached the hunters and asked them not to kill the deer. 165 The
court responded by saying that their right "to express their opposition to
the taking of wild animals does not include the right to do so in a man-
ner that disturbs or interferes with another's right to lawfully take wild
animals."' 166 As a result, the convictions were upheld. 167
In the companion case of State v. Wicklund,168 Minnesota again
upheld the constitutionality of its hunter harassment law. 169 The facts in
this case were identical to those in Miner. 170 The defendant was among
a group of protestors in a state park who conversed with a hunter and
remained camped out beneath his deer stand.' 71 Following his failure to
obey an order to disperse, the defendant was arrested. 172 The court
upheld his conviction, finding that he acted with intent to prevent or
disrupt the taking of a wild animal or the hunter's enjoyment of the
outdoors, and that as a result, he disturbed a hunter who was lawfully
161. Id.
162. Id. at 584.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 584-85.
165. Id. at 585.
166. Id. at 586.
167. Id.
168. No. C3-96-1027, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 246 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1997).
169. Id. at *5.
170. Id. at *4.
171. Id. at *2-3.
172. Id. at *3.
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taking a wild animal.' 73
J. Illinois
In 1997, and again in 1998, Illinois had an opportunity to decide
the fate of its hunter harassment statute. The appellate court's decision
in Woodstock Hunt Club v. Hindi'7 4 and the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Sanders,175 however, produced different results. In
Hindi, the defendants used sirens, bullhorns, megaphones, and an
engine-powered glider to scare geese away from the lands of the plain-
tiffs' hunting club. 176 They were charged with violating section 125/2 of
the hunter interference law which prohibits a person from: (a) interfering
with the "lawful taking of a wild animal" if the person acted with intent
to prevent the taking; and from (b) disturbing or engaging in any activity
that disturbs a wild animal if done with intent to prevent the taking of
the animal. 177 Section 125/2(c) also prohibited an individual from dis-
turbing another who was taking or who was in the process of taking a
wild animal "with intent to dissuade or otherwise prevent the taking."' 78
The appellate court first determined that subsections (a), (b), and
(c) involved both communicative and noncommunicative activity, as
they failed to distinguish between verbal and physical conduct.179 The
court then held that the three provisions were a content-neutral, not a
content-based, regulation.18 ° The court stated that "[a] person may vio-
late the Act by shouting 'Fire!,' by waving a placard proclaiming 'Hunt-
ing is good!' in front of a hunter, or by playing the 1812 Overture on a
stereo system" if done with an intent to dissuade or prevent a hunter
from taking the wild animals. 8' The court observed that the statute did
not single out any particular point of view or opinion, and thus was not
concerned with the content of the message.182 The court rejected the
173. Id. at *5. The court acknowledged that Miner was dispositive of this case, as both cases
involved the same constitutional issues. Id. at *4. The court noted that although Miner eliminated
the "dissuade" element from the specific intent portion of the statute, the defendant here was
nevertheless liable, as he had actually "prevented" or "disrupted" the taking of an animal, which
were the two specific intent terms that Miner left intact. See id. at *5. Minnesota subsequently
amended section 97A.037 in 1998. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97A.037 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
Section 97A.037(l) is for all intents and purposes identical to the version analyzed in Miner and
Wicklund except for the fact that the "dissuade" element has been removed.
174. 684 N.E.2d 1089 (I11. App. Ct 1997).
175. 696 N.E.2d 1144 (Ill. 1998).
176. Hindi, 684 N.E.2d at 1091-92.
177. 720 I11. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/2(a)(b) (West 1996).
178. Id. 125/2(c).
179. Hindi, 684 N.E.2d at 1093.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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contention that the "dissuade" element of the specific intent portion of
the section brought the statute into a more communicative realm and
found instead that "[a]ny expression suppressed by the Act is out of
concern for its intentionally disruptive nature, not for its likely commu-
nicative impact."' 83
In Sanders, the defendant yelled at a hunter and took her photo-
graph as the hunter was about to shoot a deer on the grounds of a deer
relocation center. 84 The court first determined that the "dissuade" ele-
ment in section 125/2(c) was impermissibly content-based, not content-
neutral. 185 In so doing, the court looked to the decision reached in
Miner and the etymological underpinnings of the term "dissuade," as
well as to Lilburn and Hindi where the courts read the term in light of
the larger scheme imposed by the statute, and found that the term was
intended to prohibit the act of interfering, without any reference to the
content of the particular message.1 8 6 The Illinois Supreme Court found
that had the state intended to apply the "dissuade" element without
regard to the message evoked by the conduct, it could have limited the
specific intent portion of the subsection to read "intent to prevent," as
section 125/2(a) did.187 The court entertained the argument that a con-
tent-based provision, such as section 125/2(c), could still avoid unconsti-
tutionality if the state offered a compelling interest in passing it.188 The
court, however, was not convinced that such an interest existed, finding,
as did the court in Miner, that the legislature's decision to protect hunt-
ing by focusing on the expression of a point of view, as opposed to a
general prohibition on intentional and disruptive behavior, was difficult
to justify. 89 In conclusion, the court found section 125/2(c) unconstitu-
tional, and therefore excised it from the Hunter Inference Act, thereby
rendering moot a discussion of vagueness and overbreadth. 190
183. Id.
184. State v. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d 1,144, 1146 (Ill. 1998).
185. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d at 1148.
186. Id. at 1147-48.
187. Id. at 1148.
188. Id. at 1148-49.
189. Id. at 1149. The court acknowledged that Illinois had a legitimate and reasonable interest
in wanting to permit hunting within its borders, but noted that penalizing the expression of ideas,
even those that were contrary to hunting, did not amount to a compelling state interest. See id.
The court did not go into detail, however, as to why no compelling interest existed.
190. Id. In 1997, Illinois amended the Hunter Interference Act. Subsection (a) now reads:
"Willfully obstructs or interferes with the lawful taking of wild animals by another person with the
specific intent to prevent that lawful taking." See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/2 (West Supp.
2000) in its current version. The amended statute also deleted subsections (b) and (c) in their
entirety. As a new element, the statute now includes a series of acts that constitute specific
violations of subsection (a). These directly parallel the specific acts enumerated in the revised
version of section 53a- 1 83a, Connecticut General Statutes, as amended after Dorman and upheld
in Ball.
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In dissent, Justice Harrison argued that the majority should have
applied the communicative analysis to each provision of the statute, and,
in so doing, would thereby have found that the entire statute should have
been declared unconstitutional. 19' On the other hand, Justice Bilandic,
also in dissent, argued that section 125/2(c) did not implicate the content
of the message being conveyed; rather, it merely prohibited the act of
disrupting or disturbing a hunter while he or she is engaged in
hunting. 192
K. Texas Revisited
A year after Sanders, Texas had another opportunity to consider its
own hunter harassment statute, in Richardson v. State.'93 The defendant
apparently rode up and down the perimeter of his land adjoining a ranch
that operated a deer lease and fired his gun into the air in an effort to
scare away deer from some hunters.' 94 He was charged with violating
section 62.0125(c) of the Sportsman's Rights Act, which provided: "No
person may intentionally interfere with another person lawfully engaged
in the process of hunting or catching wildlife."' 95 The defendant argued
that the state was required to prove not only the elements of section
62.0125(c), but also those of section 62.0125(d), which provided: "No
person may intentionally harass, drive, or disturb any wildlife for the
purpose of disrupting a person lawfully engaged in the process of hunt-
ing or catching wildlife."'' 96 The court, however, rejected this argument,
finding that the state charged the defendant with a violation of section
62.0125(c) and that the jury was properly instructed as to the elements
of that subsection. 197
L. New Jersey
The most recent hunter harassment decision was that reached by an
appellate court in New Jersey in the 1999 case of Binkowski v. State. 98
The plaintiffs were a group of individuals who alleged that they were
interested in the protection of animals. 99 They brought an action seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that the New Jersey hunter harassment stat-
ute was unconstitutional, and an injunction preventing state officials
191. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d at 1153.
192. Id.
193. No. 01-95-01288-CR 1999, Tex. App. LEXIS 308 (Tex. App. Jan. 21, 1999).
194. Id. at *2-3.
195. Id. at *4 (referring to TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 62.0125(c) (Vernon 1991)).
196. Id. at *5 (referring to TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 62.0125(d) (Vernon 1991)).
197. Id. at *6.
198. 731 A.2d 64 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
199. Id. at 67.
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from enforcing its provisions. 00 The complaint focused on two subsec-
tions of the statute: section 23:7A(2)(a), which provided: "No person
may, for the purpose of hindering or preventing the lawful taking of
wildlife, block, obstruct, or impede, or attempt to block, obstruct, or
impede, a person lawfully taking wildlife;" and section 23:7A(2)(g),
which prohibited, for purposes of hindering or preventing the taking of
wildlife, a person from making or attempting to make "loud noises or
gestures, set out or attempt to set out animal baits, scents, or lures or
human scent, use any other natural or artificial visual, aural, olfactory, or
physical stimuli ...to disturb [or] alarm the behavior of wildlife, or
annoy a person lawfully taking wildlife."2 0°
The appellate court first observed that the statute, by its terms,
clearly regulated conduct, not speech.202 Although the First Amendment
protects conduct which is sufficiently mixed with elements of communi-
cation and which demonstrates an intent to convey a specific message
(along with the likelihood that the message would be understood by
those witnessing it), the court ruled that New Jersey's hunter harassment
statute regulated conduct that was not sufficiently expressive to warrant
constitutional protection.20 3 In other words, the statute prohibited con-
duct that was not "integral to or commonly associated with expression,"
such as picketing or handbilling.2 °4 The court noted that virtually all of
the United States Supreme Court cases that addressed issues of "expres-
sive conduct" that implicated First Amendment challenges were "as
applied" cases and not facial challenges to statutory terms.2 0 5
The court rejected the plaintiffs' overbreadth argument on grounds
that it failed to allege a "real and substantial" threat to constitutional
liberties, as the plaintiffs did not show how the statute might infringe on
an individual's freedom of speech.20 6 Furthermore, the court construed
the statute to apply only to harassment or interference that takes place in
areas where wildlife may be found, or in the immediate proximity
thereto, and only if effected with intent to interfere with the lawful tak-
ing of wildlife. 0 7 Protestors would still be able to get their message
across in the areas outside the immediate proximity of the hunting
grounds.20 8
200. Id. at 67-68.
201. Id. at 68 (referring to N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:7A(2) (West 1993)).
202. Id. at 69.
203. Id. at 70.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 71.
206. Id. at 73.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 74.
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The court next concluded that sections 23:7A(2)(a) and (g) were
not vague. The terms used in the sections were not so unusual or
extraordinary that a person of average intelligence would need to consult
a dictionary in order to understand them. 2°9 The court therefore con-
cluded that the statute was constitutional.21 °
IV. SECTION 372.705, Florida Statutes
In its current form, Florida's version of the hunter harassment stat-
ute is similar in certain respects to those of the other states outlined in
Part III of this Comment. As is the apparent custom across the nation,
violation of Florida's statute also subjects the offender to a misdemeanor
charge.21 ' Following is Florida's current hunter harassment law:
372.705 Harassment of hunters, trappers, or fishers.
(1) A person may not intentionally, within a publicly or privately
owned wildlife management or fish management area or on any state-
owned water body:
(a) Interfere with or attempt to prevent the lawful taking of fish,
game, or nongame animals by another.
(b) Attempt to disturb fish, game, or nongame animals or attempt to
affect their behavior with the intent to prevent their lawful taking by
another. 2t2
Section 372.705, Florida Statutes, provides for the protection of
fishermen as well as hunters, whereas some states only make reference
to the latter group.21 3 As can be seen, the terms of the statute are similar
to the terms of some of the statutes mentioned throughout Part III of this
Comment, but differ somewhat in form from some of the others.
V. ANALYSIS
As mentioned at the outset of this Comment, Florida's hunter har-
assment statute has not been challenged in the appellate courts. As a
result, unlike the states highlighted in Part III, Florida does not have the
benefit of case law to interpret its statute. In anticipation of such a case
eventually developing in Florida, this part of the Comment provides an
209. Id. at 76.
210. Id. at 77. The court did not consider the free exercise of religion claim that one of the
plaintiffs had advanced, as she had failed to support it by competent evidence of her religious
beliefs.
211. See FLA. STAT. § 372.705(2) (2001).
212. See FLA. STAT. § 372.705 (2001).
213. See id. As an example, compare OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.03 (entitling the statute
"Harassment of hunters, trappers and fishermen," thereby making apparent the fact that hunting as
well as fishing is a protected activity), with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-183a (making no
separate provision in the title for fishing, but placing it under the general heading of "wildlife").
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analysis of section 372.705, Florida Statutes, and predicts how a court
in the state might approach a constitutional challenge to the statute.
Florida's law will be analyzed herein under each of the principles devel-
oped in the precedent hunter harassment cases decided in the other ten
states. It is important to emphasize, however, that this analysis is not
intended as a protest instruction manual and readers are not encouraged
to rely entirely on any of the suggestions mentioned herein. One must
remember that a court of law in Florida is the ultimate interpreter of the
state's hunter harassment law, and it might maintain a different point of
view from those reached in the other ten states.
A. Section 372.705 Under the New Hampshire Rule
214
Upon first glance, the New Hampshire and Florida statutes seem to
be quite similar. Both prohibit interference with lawfully taking wild-
life, and make it a violation to disturb or scare away wildlife so that
hunters are unable to shoot. There is, however, one interesting differ-
ence between the two statutes. In section 372.705(1)(a) of the Florida
version, all that is outlawed is the interference or the attempt to prevent
the taking of wildlife, while in the New Hampshire equivalent, one must
not only interfere with the taking of wildlife, but must also act with
intent to prevent the taking."5 Thus, a specific intent element is present
in New Hampshire, but not in Florida. Note, however, that in section
372.705(l)(b) of the Florida statute, a person must disturb a wild animal
with intent to prevent its taking, and thus the section involves a specific
intent. 6 In 1986, the New Hampshire Supreme Court struck down the
state's proposed version of the hunter harassment law, which contained
a specific intent requirement. 17 One might wonder whether Florida's
section 372.705(l)(a) would survive similar judicial scrutiny, given the
fact that it does not even have a specific intent element.
The New Hampshire court was also displeased with the provision
that outlawed the disturbance of an animal's behavior, most notably
because it contained no limiting construction or area confinements, and
214. The analysis here will use the New Hampshire statute in the form in which it appeared
before the justices of the state supreme court in 1986. It should be noted, however, that the state
has since revised the statute. The new version prohibits a person from "purposely obstruct[ing] or
imped[ing] the participation of any individual in the lawful activity of hunting, fishing or trapping
while that individual is in a designated hunting area on public lands." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 207:57(I) (2000). The statute also provides: "No person shall enter or remain in a designated
hunting area on any state lands with the intent to purposely obstruct or impede the participation of
any individual in the lawful activity of hunting, fishing or trapping." Id.
215. See FLA. STAT. § 372.705(l)(a) (2001); Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d 749, 751 (N.H.
1986).
216. FLA. STAT. § 372.705(1)(b) (2001).
217. Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d at 751.
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could therefore have theoretically subjected to liability a landowner who
posted "no hunting" signs or invited animals on to his own property.
Florida's statute addresses this concern directly on point by requiring
that the disruption or disturbance occur within the borders of a wildlife
management area or state-owned body of water.218 Thus, this provision
would most likely survive the New Hampshire rule's overbreadth and
vagueness discussion.
The New Hampshire court also struck down the provision that
made it a crime to interfere with a hunter with intent to dissuade her
from hunting, as this prohibition effectively discriminated among view-
points and criminalized only those ideas that were expressed with an
anti-hunting sentiment. Florida's statute does not contain such a provi-
sion. The New Hampshire rule would permit an activist to try to dis-
suade a hunter, and thus an individual in Florida might consider limiting
his protest tactics to those involving argumentation and persuasion, as
they would be insulated under the New Hampshire rule.
The court in New Hampshire was also concerned that "interfere,"
as it was used within the meaning of the statute, was not necessarily
limited to physical acts, but might encompass speech or expression.
Florida's law does not distinguish between "speech" and "physical con-
duct" in its use of the term "interfere," and thus under the New Hamp-
shire rule, section 372.705(1)(a) would probably be struck down since
seemingly innocent speech is accorded the same treatment as both
inflammatory comments and outward, physical activity.
B. Section 372.705 Under the Connecticut Rule
The Dorman rule interprets the term "interfere" as involving physi-
cal as well as verbal expression in the absence of any indication by the
legislature to the contrary. The Florida statute does not draw a distinc-
tion between acts that would constitute an "interference," and some
form of verbal communication that would serve the same function. As a
result, the Dorman court would consider Florida's section
372.705(1)(a)2 19 as a regulation of pure speech, as "interference" would
be directly linked not only to conduct, which would be a permissible
regulation, but also to speech, which would be targeted only for its anti-
hunting message. The only way for Florida to save this subsection from
unconstitutionality, at least under the Dorman rule, would be to demon-
218. See FLA. STAT. § 372.705(1) (2001).
219. Dorman also invalidated the Connecticut provision that prohibited the "harassment" of
hunters with intent to prevent the taking of wildlife. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir.
1998). As Florida's statute deals only with "interference," however, this Comment will not
address the "harassment" subsection in the original Connecticut statute.
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strate a compelling state interest in seeking to protect hunters, fishers,
and trappers from verbal interference. It is important to emphasize that
Dorman did not hold that use of a term like "interference," which can be
interpreted not only to encompass speech, but also to regulate the con-
tent of that speech, automatically translates into the absence of a com-
pelling state interest to justify the term's import. On the contrary,
Dorman merely held that Connecticut did not advance such an interest at
trial. Florida might consider the advice given by the Second Circuit and
express a compelling interest should a trial on the merits of a constitu-
tional challenge to section 372.705 surface in the future.22 °
Florida might also survive a challenge to section 372.705(l)(a) on
an additional ground. The Dorman rule also takes into account the fact
that the term "interfere" is not limited by any time, place, or circum-
stance requirement. As such, in Connecticut, an activist would have
been subject to liability if he or she were involved in a scuffle with a
hunter while standing in line at the supermarket. In Florida, however, a
similar incident would not subject the activist to liability under section
372.705. The statute applies only to activity taking place on the grounds
of a wildlife management or state-owned body of water.22 ' Thus, Flor-
ida directly anticipated the concern expressed by the Second Circuit
(i.e., the potentially far-reaching and practically limitless geographical
scope of the hunter harassment prohibition) and limited the locations in
which conduct can be prohibited.
An argument may be raised that the Second Circuit developed the
"controlled scope" rule in Dorman only for provisions in statutes that
deal with "acts in preparation." Such an argument is not without merit.
The vast majority of the Dorman opinion does, in fact, deal with the
"acts in preparation" term in the statute. Nevertheless, the spirit of the
opinion suggests that the Second Circuit would most likely have found
the statute constitutional if it had been drafted in a manner similar to that
of Florida's hunter harassment law. Under Florida law, interference can
be prohibited by the state as long as it is narrowly tailored and confined
to a legitimate location, provided that innocent speech is not the subject
of regulation.
The Ball interpretation of the Connecticut statute may be something
220. Specific interests tend to be tailored to each state and fit that particular state's needs.
Certain interests, however, may exist across the board. For example, public safety is a major
concern. See Roegge, supra note 16, at 460. The potential for accidental death or injury on the
hunting field is great for both activists and hunters alike. Another interest that states generally
seem to possess is conservation. Hunters, in effect, keep the population of various species of
animals in check and help minimize the spread of disease and other ecological threats.
Furthermore, fees and licenses collected from the hunters contribute to state revenue. Id.
221. See FLA. STAT. § 372.705(1) (2001).
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for Florida to consider. The amended statute in Connecticut added such
terms as "obstruct" and "at the location [where the hunt is taking place]"
to cure the two major concerns stemming from the Dorman rule: (1)
insufficient emphasis on physical acts; and (2) unlimited scope of
enforcement. The new statute went so far as to enumerate seven specific
events that would subject a perpetrator to liability. It may come as no
surprise that these events are all physical acts: driving away wildlife;
blocking a hunter; using artificial or natural stimuli to scare away game;
constructing barriers; placing oneself in the line of fire; affecting the
condition of property; and entering lands with intent to engage in any of
these events.222 The Ball rule, however, does not treat these events as
clear-cut in terms of "physicality" as Connecticut would have intended.
Ball advises that certain types of physical acts, such as picketing, danc-
ing, and wearing armbands, though traditionally viewed as acts in and of
themselves, do, in fact, implicate communicative elements. Further-
more, "driving away wildlife" could always be accomplished verbally,
as well as physically (perhaps by screaming at the animal). Thus, the
curative intent of the enumerated events was not accomplished in the
way in which the legislature envisioned.
The Ball rule, however, as it applied to its facts, found that the
policy reasons behind the amended version of the statute were not meant
to discriminate among the expressive content of the acts themselves.
Rather, the policy indicated that it was not so much the underlying mes-
sage being conveyed as it was the physical act of disruption itself that
eventually ensued. The Ball rule would apply evenhandedly to an
animal rights' activist sounding a siren or other noisemaker just as it
would to a hunter setting scent bombs to lure game away from other
hunters. Obviously, the message conveyed by the two individuals would
be strikingly different, but for purposes of liability under the Connecti-
cut statute, the underlying content of the message is irrelevant.
The activists in Ball followed the hunter on to the lands of the state
park and formed a semi-circle around him.22 3 The court suggested that
this type of activity was not what has traditionally been labeled as an
"expressive activity" (i.e., picketing, certain kinds of dancing, etc.) mer-
iting protection of free speech under the First Amendment. The Ball
court hinted that had the activists engaged in an activity like picketing,
the analysis would have stopped there, and the statute as applied to them
would have been unconstitutional. The Ball rule, therefore, suggests a
possible way in which animal rights' activists may escape liability under
a hunter harassment law. The activists must engage in an activity that
222. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183a (2001).
223. State v. Ball, 627 A.2d 892, 895 (Conn. 1993).
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has been traditionally imbued with elements of free speech and must not
violate any other provision of a hunter harassment statute that is other-
wise constitutional.
Under the Florida statute, as the Dorman rule would suggest, the
term "interfere" might be problematic because it does not distinguish
between verbal communication and physical acts. Thus, it might be
constitutionally infirm. Activists might be able to rely on the Ball rule
and engage in an activity like picketing, as the "interfere" prohibition is
not otherwise constitutional in and of itself. The activist would still be
violating the Florida statute but could not be constitutionally prosecuted
under it if a court in Florida were to follow the rule established in Ball.
The Ball rule leaves one issue unresolved. A content-neutral regu-
lation must still survive a "state interest" analysis. On remand in Ball,
the issue turned on whether the land on which the hunting took place
was a traditional public or nonpublic forum.224 The court there ulti-
mately concluded that the state park at issue was a nonpublic forum.
22 5
A court in Florida would likely arrive at the same conclusion. Most
would consider hunting and fishing preserves to be nonpublic areas.
They are not the type of setting that has been traditionally associated
with the free exchange of ideas. As a result, the Ball rule would there-
fore require the Florida legislature to advance a reasonable, as opposed
to significant, state interest in passing section 372.705.
C. Section 372.705 Under the Ohio & Texas Rules
22 6
The Ohio rule stems from the premise that when one is charged
with violating a provision in a hunter harassment statute, the court will
not necessarily ignore other provisions in the statute that may provide a
defense. The Ohio rule essentially states that one cannot be charged
with preventing the taking of wildlife by creating distractions on land A
to scare wildlife away, pursuant to one subsection of a hunter harass-
ment law, if another subsection of that same law requires that the act be
performed on land B. The rule encompasses the policy that terms of a
hunter harassment statute cannot be read in isolation from one another if
doing so would effectively thwart the intention behind the statute. 'Thus,
224. See supra note 96.
225. See supra note 104. Traditional public fora typically include public streets, sidewalks,
and parks. See Durrant, supra note 14, at 530.
226. These states are grouped together for two important reasons. First, the courts in both
states did not actually address the constitutionality of their hunter harassment laws per se, but
analyzed the provisions and applied them to the facts of the case. See, e.g., State v. Mueller, 681
N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (Shaw, J., concurring separately) (reserving judgment for
another occasion as to whether the Ohio hunter harassment law is constitutional). Second, the
courts in both states reached different outcomes on practically the same issue.
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according to a literal reading of the Ohio rule, if an activist in Florida
were to stand one inch off the property of a wildlife management or
state-owned body of water and engage in disturbing and distracting
wildlife in violation of section 372.705 (1)(b), such as by sounding an
air horn or blowing off firecrackers, she cannot be charged in violation
of the hunter harassment statute because she was not technically on the
wildlife management or state-owned body of water when engaging in
the conduct. While she may be liable for breaking community sound
ordinances or other local nuisance laws, Florida could not impose liabil-
ity under its hunter harassment law in light of the Ohio rule. An
observer might wonder, though, whether this was the intent of the Ohio
Court of Appeals in fashioning its rule. The plaintiff in Mueller was not
engaging in publicly disruptive conduct by waving her arms and trying
to prevent the deer from returning to the neighbor's yard. Nor was she
on public property when the incident occurred. Query whether the Ohio
court would have been as lenient to the plaintiff had she blown off air
horns or created other disturbances while standing at the entrance to a
state park on the day of a hunt.
The Texas rule provides a somewhat different approach. The rule
states that all an activist need do to incur liability under the hunter har-
assment statute is to "intentionally interfere with [a hunter] lawfully
engaged in the process of hunting or catching wildlife," '227 while the
hunter is on "land or water on which [she] has the right or privilege of
hunting or catching that wildlife." '228 There is no requirement that the
activist be on the same land as the hunter while engaging in protest.
This suggests that the Texas rule's interpretation of geographical restric-
tion is more loosely defined than those of the other states. This does not
appear to comport with the Dorman rule's requirement that geographical
restrictions be specifically defined.
In Henry, the court applied the Texas rule and left the plaintiff with
no opportunity to raise a constitutional challenge. The appellate court
decided that the interfering activity did not have to take place on the
same land as the hunting itself.22 9 This rule would not apply in Florida,
as section 372.705 specifically requires the harassing activity to occur
on the wildlife management lands or state-owned bodies of water.2 3 °
One might use the Texas rule, however, to stand for the proposition that
policy requires the state to step in and prevent harassment or interfer-
ence of hunters engaged in the lawful act of taking wildlife, whether or
227. TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 62.0125(c) (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 2001).
228. Id. § 62.0125(b)(2).
229. Henry v. State, 797 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. App. 1990).
230. See FLA. STAT. § 372.705(1) (2001).
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not the annoyance actually takes place on the same land as the hunting.
To counter this argument, an opponent need only raise the Ohio rule to
show that such a broad reading of the Florida statute would thwart its
basic purpose and stand for a bad policy decision for future cases. If a
court in Florida were to follow the decisions from the other jurisdictions,
it would view the basic purpose surrounding passage of section 372.705
as consistent with the purposes behind the other state hunter harassment
statutes. Most hunter harassment laws are passed with the purpose and
intention of reducing, or possibly eliminating, accidental shootings or
other forms of violence that occur on hunting lands when protestors and
hunters collide. Permitting activists to express their opinions off or near
the hunting lands would promote safety and would still provide the
activists with an opportunity to make their views known. Therefore, if
activists and hunters alike would be protected if protests were to take
place off or near hunting lands, the intent of the state legislatures in
enacting hunter harassment statutes would be realized. As such, broad-
ening the Texas rule, or following the Ohio rule as amended after Muel-
ler, to encompass protests taking place adjacent to a hunting area would
seriously undermine legislative intent. Furthermore, permitting a court
to ignore provisions of statutes that serve to exculpate an individual
from a crime would amount to a bad policy decision and would disrupt
the criminal law system altogether. If statutory provisions are not fol-
lowed, then it is hard to imagine why a future court could not use this
reasoning as support for a decision to ignore an enumerated affirmative
defense in a manslaughter statute and find an individual guilty of a crime
even if she acted in self-defense.
The other part of the Texas rule, stemming from the Richardson
case, applies only when an activist or some other party engages in activ-
ity to scare away or disrupt wildlife. The rule requires the state to show
only that the person succeeded in interfering with the hunter, not neces-
sarily that the person scared away the wildlife with the intent to prevent
its taking, even if the person actually engaged in the latter activity. The
burden of proof, particularly that of specific intent, is thereby lessened.
Once again, the Ohio rule would command that the court not ignore
other relevant portions of the statute and would require the state to prove
that the person acted with the specific intent to disrupt the hunter, rather
than merely to show a general interference. The second part of the
Texas rule would be particularly appealing to a prosecutor in Florida
who cannot find evidence that a perpetrator acted with the specific intent
to prevent the taking of wildlife under section 372.705(1)(b). The Texas
rule would allow the prosecutor to charge the activist with a violation of
section 372.705(1)(a), which does not currently have a specific intent
mens rea, even if the activist's activity falls squarely within the conduct
2002]
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prohibited by section 372.705(1)(b). By so doing, the prosecutor's bur-
den of proof is diminished, and a conviction is more likely. Of course,
the Ohio rule would counsel against this.
D. Section 372.705 Under the Idaho Rule
The Idaho rule stems from a provision in the state's hunter harass-
ment law that prohibited an individual from "enter[ing] or remain[ing] in
any area where any animal may be taken with intent to interfere with the
lawful taking or pursuit of wildlife. ' 23 1 By contrast, Florida's statute
does not contain such a provision. Nevertheless, the Idaho provision is
similar in form to section 372.705(1)(a) (interfering with or attempting
to prevent the lawful taking of wildlife),23 2 with the notable exception
that the Idaho version introduces a specific intent element. In terms of
further similarity, "any area where any animal may be taken" as written
in the Idaho statute may be compared to "wildlife management or state-
owned water body" in the Florida statute, as the latter area undoubtedly
envisions a region where wildlife and other game may be taken.233 The
Idaho rule does not classify "interfere" as a regulation of speech.
Instead it seems to concentrate its scope on specific acts and other forms
of physical conduct. The rule, however, does consider such a term over-
broad insofar as it does not specifically limit its coverage to physical
conduct but actually may include some varieties of protected speech.
Applying the Idaho rule to a hypothetical scenario in Florida may
serve to illuminate this. distinction. Suppose an animal rights' activist in
Tampa visits a state park and begins to express her views that hunting is
immoral. She uses such phrases as, "I believe that killing animals for
sport is wrong," and "My views are that you should not take the life of
an innocent animal." Under the Idaho rule, these statements constitute
protected forms of free speech pursuant to the First Amendment. They
are not inflammatory, nor do they appear to be motivated by malice or ill
will. Notice also that the activist does nothing more than reiterate these
statements during her stay in the park and does not engage in violence or
other disruptive activities. Although she is making the statements "with
the intent to interfere with the lawful taking or pursuit of wildlife,"
under the Idaho statute, and "[to] interfere with or attempt to prevent the
lawful taking of fish, game, or nongame animals by another," under the
Florida version, the Idaho rule nevertheless insulates her from liability.
This is supported by the Casey court's observation that "someone might
231. State v. Casey, 876 P.2d 138, 139 (Idaho 1994) (quoting IDAHO CODE § 36-1510(1)(c)
(Michie 1994)).
232. FLA. STAT. § 372.705(1)(a) (2001).
233. See id. § 372.705(1); see also IDAHO CODE § 36-1510(1)(c) (Michie 1994).
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enter an area where wildlife could be legally hunted and do nothing
more than announce his opposition to hunting and his intention to inter-
fere with such taking. Such a person would be in violation of subsection
(1)(c) and yet his actions constitute protected free speech. 234 It is inter-
esting to note that the actions of the hypothetical activist do not reach
the level of physical conduct that the defendant in Casey exhibited. In
fact, the actions would be far less "dangerous. 235
The Casey dissent would have saved the subsection in question by
adding a limiting construction (the term "physically"). 236 The Florida
legislature should consider amending section 372.705(1)(a) to clarify
that the interference must be physical. This would avoid the danger that
the current version of section 372.705(1)(a) may implicate protected
forms of speech. Before undertaking such an initiative, however, it is
important to remember that section 36-1510(1)(c) of the Idaho statute
and section 372.705(1)(a) are not identical. Only a creative argument
could lead a Florida court to conclude the contrary. The Casey court
was quick to point out that it was not addressing the constitutionality of
the remaining provisions of the hunter harassment law.237 One of these
provisions currently reads: "No person shall (a) intentionally interfere
with the lawful taking of wildlife or lawful predator control by
another. ' 238 If this provision is constitutional, then it is difficult to
imagine how section 372.705(1)(a) of Florida's statute arguably could
be unconstitutional. Notice how both subsections are without specific
intent elements. However, section 36-1510(1)(c), the provision invali-
dated in Casey, did have a specific intent requirement (i.e., that the per-
son enter the lands "with the intent to interfere with the lawful taking
.... ")239 The argument can therefore be made that the Idaho rule only
accounts for protected free speech when the speaker possesses the neces-
sary mens rea to "interfere" with the taking of wildlife. The Casey court
was concerned that section 36-1510(1)(c) of the Idaho statute could be
applied to penalize a person for entering wildlife lands merely to say, "I
am against hunting." The Idaho rule permits interference in the form of
verbal communication provided that the activist's intent is only to
announce her opposition to hunting and to confine her protest to speech.
234. Casey, 876 P.2d at 140-41.
235. The dissenting judge in Casey found that both waving one's arms around to scare off
animals and standing in front of hunters as they are about to shoot are not constitutionally
permissible activities. See id. at 142. One might wonder whether he would have changed his
mind had Ms. Casey acted like the hypothetical activist in Florida, and limited her "interference"
to nothing more than statements of opinion or points of view.
236. Id. at 142.
237. Id. at 141.
238. Id. at 139 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 36-1510(1)(a) (Michie 1994)).
239. IDAHO CODE § 36-1510(1)(c) (Michie 2001).
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The rule would not insulate an activist from physically acting on her
own speech, and engaging in other activity that serves to physically dis-
rupt a hunter while he is in the process of hunting. The Idaho rule would
protect an activist in Florida if he were to enter the wildlife or fish man-
agement area with the intent only to verbally express his opposition to
hunting, without acts of physical disruption, such as sounding a siren or
standing in the line of fire.
E. Section 372.705 Under the Minnesota Rule
The Minnesota rule analyzes the provision of the hunter harassment
statute at issue in the Miner case that read: "A person who has the intent
to prevent, disrupt, or dissuade the taking of a wild animal or enjoyment
of the out-of-doors may not disturb or interfere with another person who
is lawfully taking a wild animal or preparing to take a wild animal. 24 °
The Miner court determined that the use of the word "dissuade" implied
some form of argumentation or enlightened discourse, and was thus
indisputably speech.24 ' The rule thus carves out an exception for "dis-
suasion" language. The court excised the term "dissuade," leaving intact
the remainder of the provision, including the other two specific intent
terms that the state would have to prove: "prevent" or "disrupt. '242 The
rule considered only the term "dissuade" as implicating speech. Thus
the remaining two terms, "prevent" and "disrupt," must not have dealt
with speech, but only conduct or other physical activity. The Miner
court also pointed out that the term "disturb" was not ambiguous, but
clearly understood in everyday usage, and was only triggered when a
person first possessed the specific intent of "preventing" or "disrupting"
the lawful act of taking wildlife.243
The Minnesota rule is applicable to a constitutional analysis of
Florida's hunter harassment statute for two reasons. First, as the term
"dissuade" implicates speech and therefore falls within the ambit of pro-
tection of the First Amendment, an activist in Florida seeking to avoid
application of section 372.705 (1)(a) may consider focusing the brunt of
her protest in the form of philosophical arguments and Socratic ques-
tions geared at "dissuading," not "preventing" or "disrupting," a hunter
from taking wildlife. If the Florida activist insists on using visual aids,
such as stereos, firecrackers, or smoke bombs, to assist in getting her
message across, the Minnesota rule would caution against use of any-
240. State v. Miner, 556 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting MINN. STAT.
§ 97A.037(1) (1994)).
241. Id. at 582.
242. Id. at 583.
243. Id. at 584-85.
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thing that is not, at its foundation, speech. For extra protection, the
activist should combine both the Connecticut and Minnesota rules and
carry picket signs displaying dissuasion messages or perform dances that
have as their core a dissuasion theme.
The second way the Minnesota rule applies to section 372.705
deals with subsection (1)(a). Notice again that this subsection does not
contain a specific intent requirement as did the statutory provision at
issue in Miner. The Miner court pointed out that terms such as "disturb"
and "interfere" are not ambiguous or void for vagueness because, as the
Minnesota rule indicates, the terms apply only when a person first pos-
sesses the requisite specific intent. In Minnesota, such intent is in the
form of "preventing" or "disrupting" the taking of a wild animal. As
section 372.705(1)(a) of the Florida version does not have a specific
intent requirement, the argument can be made that the Minnesota rule
would not insulate the subsection from a void-for-vagueness challenge.
Though a term like "interfere" may have an everyday understanding, it
is not susceptible to a limiting construction, nor is it specifically modi-
fied in a way that a specific intent element would accomplish. The Flor-
ida legislature may consider amending the subsection accordingly.
F. Section 372.705 Under the Montana Rule
The Montana rule also deals, almost in its entirety, with another
specific intent "dissuasion" provision. The 1994 version of the statute
provided that "a person may not disturb an individual engaged in the
lawful taking of a wild animal with intent to dissuade the individual or
otherwise prevent the taking of the animal." '244 The Lilburn court
reviewed the legislative history and found that the "dissuasion" provi-
sion did not penalize speech or other forms of verbal communication,
but the court limited the statute's reach to conduct and other tangible
acts that served to disturb the hunter while he or she was in the process
of hunting.245 The court understood "dissuade" in the context of "dis-
turb" and considered it to be more on the physical side of the spec-
trum.24 6 Thus, the Montana rule seems to be in stark contrast to the
Minnesota rule. It is debatable, however, how effective the Montana
rule can actually be. If "dissuade" in fact means "disturb," then the
Montana hunter harassment statute would read: "a person may not dis-
turb an individual engaged in the lawful taking of a wild animal with
intent to disturb the individual or otherwise prevent the taking of the
animal." The actus reus and mens rea portions of the statute are, in
244. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-142(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
245. State v. Lilbum, 875 P.2d 1036, 1042 (Mont. 1994).
246. Id. at 1043.
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essence, fused together. This is problematic, most notably because the
burden of proof that the state needs to meet is substantially lessened.
"Dissuasion," as defined under the Minnesota rule and under most
commonsense standards, involves some form of discourse or argumenta-
tion. Skilled argumentation implies prior thought and reflection. There-
fore, if "dissuade" is the specific intent element, the state would have to
prove not only that the activist spoke with the hunter, but also that he
planned the outline of his speech and pondered the details beforehand.
Conversely, "disturb" implies an act that can occur spontaneously, and
the state need only show that the activist succeeded in preventing the
hunter from taking the shot or setting the trap. The "dissuade" element
would require the state to prove substantially more than what would
suffice if "disturb" were the standard. As the actus reus portion of the
offense involves a "disturbance" as well, the state is half way toward
meeting the burden of proof if "disturb" serves as the mens rea. To
meld a specific intent requirement into an actus reus portion of a statu-
tory provision blurs the distinction between a wrongful act and a culpa-
ble mental state, both of which have been required for conviction
purposes for hundreds of years under the common law of England and
the United States. It is fundamental in criminal law that the two ele-
ments be kept separate. Blending them would make the state's job that
much easier and would unfairly prejudice an activist charged with vio-
lating a hunter harassment statute. If the Montana rule were applied in
Florida, a protestor still would be subject to prosecution under section
372.705 even if she engaged only in purely academic discourse in an
attempt to dissuade a hunter from hunting.
It is interesting to note that the Montana legislature amended the
subsection in question in 1997. The phrase "dissuade the individual or
otherwise" was deleted from the statute.247 The legislature followed the
example set in Minnesota, and left "prevent" as the only specific intent
element that the state needs to prove.
G. Section 372.705 Under the Illinois Rule
The Hindi rule seems to parallel that of Montana. Hindi places
greater emphasis on the disruptive nature of the activity and would thus
consider megaphones, bullhorns, and sirens, even if used with intent to
"dissuade" a hunter, to be a violation. The plaintiffs in Hindi engaged in
these activities, but did not limit their protest to argumentation or dis-
course. 248 It is unclear whether the Hindi court would have considered
discourse or some other "verbal only" communication as grounds for
247. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-142(3) (1997).
248. Woodstock Hunt Club v. Hindi, 684 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (I11. App. Ct. 1997).
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liability under the statute. One could argue that the decision would not
have been different. The court stated that an individual could violate the
provisions of the statute by "shouting 'Fire!,' by waving a placard pro-
claiming 'Hunting is good!' in front of a hunter, or by playing the 1812
Overture on a stereo system." '249 Shouting "Fire!" or playing a stereo
might not be considered as possessing any redeeming social value.
Waving the placard, however, is different. Even though it contains a
pro-hunting message, it still would violate the statute if it were done to
dissuade a hunter from hunting. This seems to directly contradict the
Connecticut rule, as this type of activity could easily be considered a
traditional form of conduct protected by the First Amendment, such as
picketing and other similar events.
This apparent discrepancy, however, is corrected in the Sanders
rule, which supplants the Hindi rule. The Sanders rule reflects the view
that "dissuade" does in fact involve the elements of speech and commu-
nication. Had the Illinois legislature intended to classify "dissuade"
more along the lines of "prevent," it would have drafted the subsection
containing "dissuade" in the same way as it did section 125/2(a), which
stated that interference with the taking of a wild animal is illegal if done
"with intent to prevent the taking. '25" The Sanders rule nevertheless
permits a statute to regulate "dissuasion" in effect (as a content-based
statute) if there is a compelling state interest to support it.25 In the
Sanders case, however, the Illinois Supreme Court was not able to see
how regulating the content of a "dissuasion"-type speech was necessary
to protect hunters from interference. 2
Applying the Sanders rule in Florida, it would appear permissible
for an activist to engage in activity that dissuades a hunter from taking
wildlife. In response, however, the state would be able to argue, using
the Hindi rule, that even dissuasion is prohibited, not because of the
content or central idea behind the message, but rather, because of its
tendency to incite disruptive and potentially dangerous behavior.
Because the Florida statute does not specifically make reference to dis-
suasion, it stands a better chance of passing constitutional muster than
the Illinois statute that effectively singled out dissuasive behavior for
prosecution. Florida would need to prove that the term "interfere" in
section 372.705(1)(a) includes dissuasive commentary. To avoid appli-
cation of the First Amendment, however, Florida would have to argue
that a compelling state interest is served by the inclusion of dissuasive
249. Id. at 1093.
250. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/2(a) (West 1996) (emphasis added).
251. State v. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Il. 1998).
252. Id. at 1149.
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speech within the meaning of section 372.705(1)(a). The Sanders court
was unable to make the connection between state interest and regulation
of discourse. The argument can be made, however, that the Illinois
Supreme Court was heavily against the connection, as the statute specifi-
cally included the term "dissuade" as part of its terms over and above
the "prevent" specific intent requirement in the other subsection. Per-
haps the Illinois legislature acted intentionally to distinguish "prevent"
from "dissuade," reserving the former for conduct and the latter for
speech. Because Florida's statute could be interpreted to apply across
the board, one might conclude that the Florida legislature was not in fact
motivated by the content of the message, but instead by its potential
repercussions.
The Sanders rule is also important for activists in Florida for
another reason. The plaintiff in Sanders apparently yelled at a hunter
and took her photograph.253 The court nevertheless accorded these acts
constitutional protection, as they were intended to "dissuade" the hunter,
which in essence rendered them forms of "speech." This new scenario
changes the hypothetical case of the Florida activist developed under the
Idaho rule. It would permit the activist to engage in a slightly more
"heated" protest than silently displaying argumentative discourse on a
picket sign or subjecting the hunter to the Socratic method. Of course,
the activist must take heed that she is engaging in the conduct with the
intent to "dissuade" and not to "prevent" the hunter from taking wildlife.
H. Section 372.705 Under the Wisconsin Rule
The Wisconsin rule would prove extremely useful to the Florida
legislature should it decide to amend section 372.705(1)(a). The Wis-
consin rule considers the terms "obstruct" and "impede" to be more
refined than the general term "interfere," and the rule treats them both as
limiting constructions for "interfere." The Wisconsin statute makes it an
offense to "interfere" with lawful hunting "with the intent to prevent the
taking" of wildlife by "impeding or obstructing" a hunter.254 The Wis-
consin statute incorporates not only the Connecticut rule's concern with
the verbal-nonverbal distinction, but also the Minnesota rule's require-
ment that the specific intent term trigger the necessary actus reus ele-
ment before liability can come into play. The Bagley court concluded
that the terms "impede" and "obstruct" did not implicate verbal commu-
nication, as the statute listed them apart from the term "interfere," and as
it contained a provision for protection of free speech as an affirmative
253. Id. at 1146.
254. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 29.083(2)(a)(3) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
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defense. 5 Moreover, the defendants could not reasonably allege that
the activity in which they engaged (i.e., blocking a boat dock with their
own boat) that triggered the "impede" and "obstruct" provisions,
amounted to constitutionally protected speech.256 Perhaps, if the
defendants engaged merely in chants or carried picket signs, they would
have had more success in a constitutional challenge. They could have
argued that imposing liability on their actions, under violations of
"impede" and "obstruct" terminology, is an impermissible regulation of
speech.
Florida should consider whether to further classify violations
within the meaning of section 372.705(1)(a). "Interfere," standing
alone, will result in a somewhat troublesome outcome under practically
any of the aforementioned rules. By following the Wisconsin rule and
incorporating physical acts that serve to describe how "interference"
may be effected within the meaning of section 372.705(1)(a), the Florida
legislature would lead one to rationally conclude that speech and other
forms of verbal communication are not the target of the subsection, and
that these forms of verbal communication still enjoy constitutional pro-
tection. A problem arises, however, even with concrete terms like
"impede" and "obstruct." Had the plaintiffs in Bagley actually engaged
purely in innocent speech, or in an activity that has been traditionally
imbued with elements of speech, a question arises as to whether this
would have resulted in an "impediment" or an "obstruction" within the
meaning of the Wisconsin statute. According to the Wisconsin rule, the
answer is no. Nevertheless, liability would probably still attach, as the
speech would "pass through" the concrete terms, and revert back to the
abstract term "interfere." Under the Minnesota rule, the Wisconsin stat-
ute would still be constitutional, as it contains the specific intent term
"prevent." Thus, liability would be imposed on the activist who pos-
sesses the "prevent" mens rea. Admittedly, it is speech that is being
implicated in the preceding analysis, but the message or content of that
speech is not necessarily the target. For example, in Bagley, the state
could also have imposed liability on a rival fisherman who verbally con-
fronted the Native American spearfishers in an attempt to prevent them
from fishing in what he considered to be "his" area. As it is speech in
general that is being implicated, however, the state interest analysis
would then come into play. The important concept to bear in mind is
that the specific intent portion of the statute is in play throughout the
process. Florida's section 372.705(1)(a) is without such a specific intent
element, and thus it might be beneficial for one to be added.
255. State v. Bagley, 474 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
256. Id.
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The Wisconsin rule may also be analyzed under a void-for-vague-
ness challenge. The rule does not permit an individual to make this
claim if the terms of the statute clearly prohibit the conduct in which he
engaged. Thus, an activist in Florida should pay close attention to the
terms of section 372.705. The activist would notice that section
372.705(l)(b) only imposes liability for attempting to disturb or affect
the behavior of wildlife. Thus, under the Wisconsin rule, if he actually
succeeds in disturbing or affecting the behavior of the wildlife, his con-
duct would not be proscribed, and he would have standing to raise a
void-for-vagueness challenge. Similarly, the Florida statute only prohib-
its interference activity on the grounds of a wildlife management or
state-owned water body. If the activist conducts his protest outside the
boundaries of the prohibited area, and if a court were to follow the Texas
rule and impose liability, the activist may also raise a void-for-vague-
ness challenge.
I. Section 372.705 Under the New Jersey Rule
The New Jersey rule prohibits a person from blocking or impeding
a hunter from taking wildlife, and also from causing distractions that
serve to scare the wildlife away. The rule incorporates a specific intent
requirement: that the person act with intent to prevent the taking. The
rule provides that "blocking,". "impeding," and "distracting" all imply
some form of pure conduct without any particular reference to expres-
sive-type conduct. It is important to remember that the plaintiffs in the
Binkowski case had not been arrested under the statute, nor had they
actually engaged in any of the prohibited activities. They were only
seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. 7
The New Jersey rule therefore counsels against declaratory judgment
actions when the plaintiff-activists fail to indicate the specific conduct in
which they plan to engage and that they consider to be constitutionally
permissible. To succeed on a constitutional challenge to Florida's hunter
harassment statute under the New Jersey rule, a plaintiff would have to
have already engaged in some form of conduct, been arrested or sub-
jected to some negative treatment under the statute, or demonstrated
with particularity the type of conduct and activity that she would have
liked to pursue. The rule appears to infer that activists may succeed on a
claim if they have engaged in the type of conduct typically protected
under the auspices of free speech, like picketing.
The New Jersey rule is also unique insofar as it limits its scope of
enforcement to the areas in which the hunting activity takes place, or in
257. Binkowski v. State, 731 A.2d 64, 67-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
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the immediate vicinity thereto. This notion is unique because the New
Jersey statute, by its terms, does not list a geographical area to be
included in its coverage. The Binkowski court did not further define
what it meant by the term "immediate vicinity." The court, however,
did admit that an activist would be permitted to engage in protest in the
region outside that area. An activist in Florida, acting under the New
Jersey rule, should be careful in selecting an area for protest. Standing
outside the wildlife management area would not appear to violate the
Florida statute, but the New Jersey rule might include such an area
within the meaning of the statute, as it could be considered the "immedi-
ate vicinity" of a hunting region. The argument can be made, however,
that the rule's geographical scope only comes into play when a statute,
like the New Jersey one at issue in Binkowski, does not make reference
to a specific area.
Lastly, the rule fashioned in New Jersey contains one interesting
caveat. The court in the Binkowski case did not consider the plaintiff's
free exercise of religion claim because she had failed to support it with
proper evidence." 8 This leads to the argument that had the plaintiff
been able to bring forth sufficient evidence, the claim may have suc-
ceeded. A Florida activist seeking to challenge section 372.705 and its
seeming prohibition of both conduct and speech might seek to use the
religious exception contained in the New Jersey rule. Of course, the
activist would need to show that the type of conduct in which she
engaged, or the speech and the message she advanced, were in further-
ance of her sincere religious beliefs and were infringed upon by the
imposition of liability under section 372.705.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 372.705, Florida Statutes, as analyzed under the various
rules developed throughout the course of this Comment, would be sub-
jected to differing outcomes depending upon the specific circumstances
at stake. As a general rule, however, it would appear that a hunter har-
assment statute that fails to distinguish among acts that are purely indic-
ative of conduct, acts that involve behavior traditionally imbued with
elements of speech, and activity characterized by communicative speech
and other verbal pronouncements, will be subject to the strictest scru-
tiny. Absent a compelling state interest (i.e., one that involves a very
high threshold of proof) to support passage of the statute, a court may
have no choice but to declare the statute unconstitutional. Provisions in
258. Id. at 77.
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a statute that target "dissuasion" as opposed to merely "preventive con-
duct" will usually not survive a compelling state interest analysis.
Specific intent elements are very important and will usually save a
hunter harassment statute from unconstitutionality, except in the rare cir-
cumstance when they are perhaps inadvertently fused with the actus reus
portion of the violations enumerated within the terms of the statute.
These elements imply a "beforehand" thought process, which normally
remove them from the realm of spontaneity and uncontrolled disruption.
As it now stands, section 372.705, Florida Statutes, only contains one
subsection with a specific intent requirement. It would be in the legisla-
ture's interest to correct the other subsection through curative terminol-
ogy and other limiting constructions, including the use of specific intent
elements,25 9 to avoid future constitutional problems.
Florida should also consider the approach used by Justice Silak in
the Casey case and insert the term "physically" into section
372.705(1)(a), thereby clearing up any confusion that the subsection
applies both to speech and to conduct.260 Activists in Florida would still
be able to engage in protests as long as (1) their protests are entirely
based on verbal communication with a focus on dissuasion, and (2) any
activity in which they engage is limited to the type of activity which has
been traditionally protected as "expressive" conduct (i.e., picketing,
dances, etc.). Florida may also want to follow the lead of states like
Connecticut, and include, as part of section 372.705, a list of enumer-
ated, physical acts that amount to violations of the statute, so as to avoid
the argument that the section is overbroad and void for vagueness.
As a final thought, consider one of the comments made in the
Miner case. The court there stated, referring to activists: "[E]xpress[ing]
their opposition to the taking of wild animals does not include the right
to do so in a manner that disturbs or interferes with another's right to
lawfully take wild animals."2 6' One may wonder, however, what makes
259. This Comment was not intended to address the issue of the specific adverbs used as part
of the mens rea in each of the statutes. For example, if the statute uses the adverb "knowingly," in
the absence of any legislative intent, the question then arises as to whether "knowingly" applies to
the term it directly modifies, or to the remainder of the terms as well. For a discussion of this
subject directly, please see section 2.01 and section 2.03 of the Model Penal Code.
260. It is interesting to note that in 1994, the federal government passed the Recreational
Hunting Safety and Preservation Act, which essentially operates as a hunter harassment statute at
the federal level. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 5201 - 5207 (1994). The statute explicitly states: "It is a
violation of this section intentionally to engage in any physical conduct that significantly hinders a
lawful hunt." Id. § 5201 (emphasis added). The federal government clearly indicated that the
intent of the statute is to regulate only physical conduct. The argument can be made that Congress
recognized the wide array of potential problems inherent in a decision to apply the terms of the
statute to speech, and thus limited the reach of the statute to activity ostensibly recognized as pure
conduct.
261. State v. Miner, 556 N.W.2d 578, 586 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
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the rights of hunters paramount to the rights of activists. The two rights
at issue are the right to hunt and the right to freely express a set of ideas.
Who has the right to say which of the two is more important or deserves
greater protection? If activists and hunters could both express their
views without infringing on one another's freedoms,262 litigation would
be drastically reduced. For example, in the Lilburn case, the hunters
were issued licenses to shoot the bison with the ultimate goal of prevent-
ing the bison's escape to other areas. Had the activists been allowed to
herd the bison back into Yellowstone Park, both they and the state
would have accomplished their respective goals. The hunters, however,
would have argued that it was nevertheless their right to shoot the bison.
They are probably right. The question then becomes: should they be
right? Of course, the answer to that question is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
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Casenote, "Shh ... Be Vewy, Vewy Quiet . .. We're Hunting Wabbits . .. (and a Proper
Interpretation of the Illinois Hunter Interference Prohibition Act)", 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 181 (1999).
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